Introduction

Background
Since amount of data is increasing exponentially, data storage and management become increasingly troublesome tasks for the data owners. To reduce the burdens for the data owners, the concept of remote storage known as cloud has been proposed. A cloud is considered as a service through which the clients can use to publish, access, manage and share their data remotely and easily from anywhere via the Internet. However, the shortcoming of this system is that a cloud storage provider could not be necessarily trusted. The cloud system thus introduces three security challenges: data availability, data integrity and data confidentiality. Because data availability and data integrity are the pre-conditions for the existence of a system, they are more important than data confidentiality. Therefore, this paper focuses on data availability and data integrity rather than data confidentiality. client does not need to reconstruct the entire file before generating new coded blocks. Instead, the coded blocks which are retrieved from the healthy servers are used to generate new coded blocks. Therefore, this paper focuses on the network coding technique.
The data cannot be checked without embedded information, i.e, Message Authentication Code (MAC) or digital signature. The MAC is sometimes called tag. The MAC is used in the symmetric key setting while the digital signature is used in the asymmetric key setting. Because this paper is based on the symmetric key setting, the MAC is used in the proposed scheme.
Network Coding-based POR. Based on the POR, many schemes have been proposed, for instance, [8] , [9] using replica, [5] - [7] using erasure coding. However, we are only aware of a few network coding-based POR schemes. Dimakis et al. [12] was the first to apply the network coding to achieve a remarkable reduction in the communication overhead of the repair component. Li et al. [13] proposed a treestructure data regeneration with the linear network coding to achieve an efficient regeneration traffic and bandwidth capacity by using an undirected-weighted maximum spanning tree. Chen et al. [14] presented the Remote Data Checking for Network Coding-based distributed storage system (RDC-NC) scheme which provides a decent solution for efficient data repair by recoding encoded blocks on the healthy servers during the repair procedure. Le et al. [15] introduced the NC-Audit scheme for efficient check and repair using a new homomorphic MAC technique called SpaceMac. Recently, Chen et al. [16] have proposed the NC-Cloud scheme to improve the cost-effectiveness of repair using the functional minimum-storage regenerating (FMSR) codes, which lightens the encoding requirement of storage nodes during repair.
In these network coding-based POR schemes, the most notable scheme is the RDC-NC scheme [14] . It, unlike the other previous schemes, not only focuses on the efficiency, but also considers how to prevent the three common attacks of the POR: replay attack, pollution attack and large corruption attack. However, the RDC-NC scheme has some shortcomings: (i) the corruption check is still inefficient because only one server can be checked per challenge and (ii) it cannot prevent another common attack of the POR: small corruption attack. The small corruption attack is defined in [6] , [17] - [19] . In this attack, the adversary tries to corrupt the data with a small data unit to hide data loss incidents. Protecting against the small corruption attack protects the data itself, not just the storage resource. Modifying a single bit may destroy an encrypted file or invalidate authentication information. The difference between the large and small corruption attacks is that the small corruption attack corrupts at most t-fraction of the file while the large corruption attack corrupts more than t-fraction of the file, where t is a parameter. These are described more details in the adversarial model (Sect. 3).
To address the small corruption attack, the common solution is to use the Error-Correcting Code (ECC) [20] , which allows the data to be checked for errors and corrected even one bit on the fly. The ECC has several types, i.e., Hamming code, Golay code, Reed-Muller code, Reed-Solomon code, etc. However, this paper uses the Reed-Solomon code because the Universal Hash Function can be constructed using the Reed-Solomon code. Bowers et al. [6] then proposed the dispersal coding using the Reed-Solomon code in order to prevent the small corruption attack and to ensure the file integrity with high probability. However, [6] uses the erasure coding instead of the network coding.
Contribution
This paper proposes a new POR scheme using the network coding and the dispersal coding, called ND-POR. To the best of our knowledge, the ND-POR scheme is the first POR to apply both the dispersal coding and the network coding. The contribution of the ND-POR scheme is described as follows:
Security. The ND-POR scheme, unlike the RDC-NC scheme, can prevent the small corruption attack.
Efficiency.
• The RDC-NC scheme allows the client to check one server for each challenge. Meanwhile, the ND-POR scheme allows the client to check all servers simultaneously for each challenge.
• In the RDC-NC scheme, the number of MACs is nαs where n denotes the number of servers, α denotes the number of coded blocks stored on a server and s denotes the number of segments in a coded block. In the ND-POR scheme, the number of MACs is only lα where l denotes some servers out of n servers (l < n) and is far less than the dominant parameter s.
• In data repair, the RDC-NC scheme uses the network coding to repair the corruptions. Meanwhile, the ND-POR scheme performs two phases: if the number of corruptions is smaller than the ECC boundary, the ECC is used to repair the corruptions; otherwise the network coding is used to repair the corruptions. Thus, the corruptions are repaired with an overwhelming probability. Furthermore, the ECC uses the parity information on the server itself to repair without the other healthy servers as the network coding.
The dispersal coding is constructed based on UMAC (MAC obtained from Universal Hash Function) which is closely related to the network coding-based schemes [21] , [22] . Hence, the network coding and the dispersal coding can be suitably combined together in the ND-POR scheme.
Organization
The background of the Proof of Retrievability, the network coding and the dispersal coding are described in Sect. 2. The adversarial model is given in Sect. 3. The ND-POR scheme is proposed in Sect. 4. The security and efficiency analyses are discussed in Sect. 6. The conclusion and future work are drawn in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries
System Model
The ND-POR scheme has two entities. The first entity is the client who can be individuals or organizations. The client outsources his/her data to a cloud storage and relies on the cloud storage for data storage and maintenance. The second entity is the cloud servers which are managed by a cloud provider. The cloud servers store the data of the clients and have responsibility to prove to the client that the stored data are always available and intact.
Proof of Retrievability
To check whether the availability and integrity of the data stored on the cloud servers are satisfied, researchers proposed Proof of Retrievability (POR) [3] - [5] which is a challenge-response protocol between a client (verifier) and a server (prover). A POR protocol has the following phases:
• keygen(1 λ ): Given a security parameter λ, the client generates a secret key (sk) and a public key (pk). For symmetric key setting, pk is set to be null.
• encode(sk, F): The client encodes an original file (F) to an encoded file (F ), then stores F on the server.
• check(sk): The client uses sk to generate a challenge (c) and sends c to the server. The server computes a response (r) and sends r back to the client. The client then verifies r to determine whether F is available and intact.
• repair(): If a corruption is detected in the check phase, the client will execute this phase to repair the corrupted data. The technique of this phase depends on the each specific scheme, e.g., replication, erasure coding or network coding.
Network Coding
The network coding [11] , [21] offers a good trade-off in terms of redundancy, reliability, and repair bandwidth. The network coding is firstly proposed in the network scenario, and is then applied in the distributed storage system scenario.
Fundamental Concept. In the network scenario, suppose that a source node wants to send a file F to a receiver node via the network. The source node firstly divides F into m 
The source node sends {b 1 
The client stores the coded blocks on the servers. {α 1 , · · · , α m } are chosen such that the matrix which consists of all the coefficients of the coded blocks has full rank. Koetter et al. [23] proved that if the prime p is chosen large enough and the coefficients are chosen randomly, the matrix will have full rank with a high probability. When a corruption is detected, the client retrieves the coded blocks from the healthy servers and linearly combines them to regenerate new coded blocks. For example, in Fig. 1 , from the augmented blocks {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 }, the client chooses the coefficients to compute six coded blocks. The client stores two coded blocks on each of the servers {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. Suppose that S 1 is corrupted, the client requests S 2 and S 3 to compute the aggregated coded blocks by themselves using the linear combinations. The client finally mixes the aggregated coded blocks to obtain two new coded blocks for the new server.
Dispersal Coding
To prevent the small corruption attack and to allow the client to repair the data with a high probability, the dispersal coding is proposed [6] with a minimal additional storage over- 
Universal Hash Function (UHF). A UHF [24] is a function h: K × I
l → I where I denotes a field with operations (+, ×). This UHF compresses a message m ∈ I l into a compact digest based on a key κ ∈ K such that the hash of two different messages is different with an overwhelming probability over keys. A common UHF is almost XOR universal (AXU) which satisfies:
• h is an -AXU family if ∀x y ∈ I l , and ∀z ∈ I:
• If a UHF is linear, for any message pair (m 1 , m 2 ):
Error-Correcting Code (ECC).
An ECC [20] is used to express a sequence of the original data and the parity data such that any errors can be detected and corrected. An ECC has two parameters (n, l) where l denotes the number of the original blocks, and n denotes the number of blocks after adding (n − l) redundant blocks. There exists (n, l)-ECC codes that can correct up to t = n−l+1 2 errors. The Reed-Solomon code (RS) [25] is a kind of ECC which uses a special polynomial:
is the information block, and a is a primitive element of the field. Encoder: The 2t parity symbols are given by:
Decoder: Given a codeword r(x) which is the original codeword c(x) plus errors: r(x) = c(x) + e(x), the RS decoder identifies the position and magnitude of up to t and corrects the errors.
• Calculating the syndrome: The RS codeword has 2t syndromes that depend on errors. The syndromes are calculated by substituting the 2t roots of g(x) into r(x).
• Finding the symbol error locations: This involves solving the equations with t unknowns. The first step is to find an error locator polynomial using the BerlekampMassey algorithm or the Euclid algorithm. The second step is to find the roots of this polynomial using the Chien search algorithm.
• Finding symbol error values: This involves solving the equations with t unknowns using the Forney algorithm.
Universal Hash Function which is constructed using the Reed-Solomon code (RS-UHF). A RS-UHF [26] is constructed in a way as follows. Suppose that a message m is a vector
where m i ∈ I and suppose that an
A RS code can be defined as a vector
where κ is the key.
Message Authentication Code (MAC).
A MAC [27] is used to authenticate a message and to detect message tampering and forgery. A MAC is a tuple of (MGen, MTag, MVer):
• MGen(1 λ ): generates a secret key κ given a security parameter λ.
• MTag κ (m): computes a tag τ for the message m with the key κ.
• MVer κ (m, τ): outputs 1 if τ is a valid tag, and 0 otherwise.
Pseudo-random Function (PRF).
A PRF [28] is used to generate exponentially many random bits in a way that behaves like a random function. A PRF is a keyed family of a function g : K PRF × L → I which is indistinguishable from a random family of functions from L to I. A PRF can be constructed from any pseudorandom generator as follows.
is the last n bits of G(x). For the key K PRF ∈ {0, 1} n and an input x ∈ {0, 1} n , the PRF is constructed as:
MAC based on Universal Hash Function (UMAC).
A UMAC [26] can be constructed as the composition of a UHF with a PRF. Given a UHF family h : K UHF × I l → I and a PRF family g : K PRF × L → I, the UMAC is a tuple of UMAC = (UGen, UTag, UVer):
• UGen(1 λ ): generates key (κ, κ ) uniformly at random from K UHF × K PRF .
• UTag κ,κ (m): works in space K UHF ×K PRF ×I l → L×I, outputs (r, h κ (m) + g κ (r)) in which a unique counter r ∈ L is increased in each execution.
• UVer κ,κ (m, (c 1 , c 2 )): works in space
Dispersal coding. The dispersal coding [14] is constructed as follows: To tag a message, the message is encoded under an (n, l)-RS code; and a PRF is then applied to the last s code symbols (s ∈ {1, · · · , n}). A MAC is obtained on each of those s code symbols using UMAC. A codeword is valid if at least one of the last s symbols is the valid MAC.
• KGenECC(1
are used for the PRF in the UMAC.
(when the number of corruptions is more than n−l+1
2 ), MVerECC outputs (⊥, 0). If one of the last s symbols of (c 1 ,
Because the dispersal coding uses the RS code in MTagECC to tag the message and uses the RS decoder in MVerECC to verify, the dispersal coding can prevent the small corruption attack.
Adversarial Model
This paper considers an adversary A as follows. A may control the servers by corrupting the servers and robbing all the privileges of the servers. If A has not corrupted a server, A cannot do anything because that all the data and the keys between the client and the servers are assumed to be transmitted via a secure channel. After A corrupts a server, A can modify/replace/forge data stored on that server and pretend to be a healthy server by providing a fake valid MAC tag to the client, can prevent the client from recovering the original file, and can perform the below four attacks (small corruption attack, large corruption attack, replay attack and pollution attack). A restriction of A is that A can control at most (n − h) out of the n servers within any time step (called epoch). More concretely, after corrupting a server, A can perform as follows:
(i) access to the encode and check phases to output a codeword c such that A can pass the verification without being detected with an advantage defined as: Adv
(ii) prevent F to be recovered in the repair phase (iii) perform the following four attacks.
Small corruption attack.
A corrupts at most a t-fraction of the file F with a small data unit, where t = n−l+1
2 , in order to hide the data loss incidents. This applies to the servers that want to preserve their reputation. To prevent the small corruption attack, the ECC is used to detect and correct errors [5] , [6] .
Large corruption attack.
A corrupts more than a t-fraction of the file F with a large data unit, where t is the same parameter as in the small corruption attack, to discard a significant fraction of the data. This applies to the servers who want to sell the storage resource to multiple clients. To prevent the large data corruption, the spot check method is proposed [1] , [4] in which the client randomly samples small portions of the data. Then, the server returns a computation over these portions of the data to the client. The results are checked by MACs. The spot check can only prevent the large corruption attack but cannot prevent the small corruption attack [1] , [3] .
Replay attack. A tries to prevent the client from repairing the corruption by re-using the old coded blocks instead of the current coded blocks and providing these old coded blocks to the client in the repair phase. For example, the client encodes the augmented blocks One of the contributions is to prevent the small corruption attack. The other three attacks are still prevented in this paper by using the same solution as the RDC-NC scheme. These are discussed in the security analysis (Sect. 5).
The Proposed ND-POR Scheme
Throughout this paper, the notations described in Table 1 are used.
In the ND-POR scheme, n servers are employed. The first l servers {S 1 , · · · , S l }, called NC-servers, store the coded blocks {c i j } i∈{1,···,l}, j∈{1,···,β} . The last (n − l) servers {S l+1 , · · · , S n }, called DC-servers, store the dispersal coding 
Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} κ → F p where κ is the key length of f and κ should be large enough (e.g., 160) || concatenate operator S y corrupted server S y new server which is used to replace S y h number of healthy servers used for data repair v number of rows used for spot checks A adversary s number of segments in a coded block of the RDC-NC scheme λ security parameter t boundary of small corruption attack or ECC threshold (t = (n − l + 1)/2) parity blocks {d i j } i∈{l+1,···,n}, j∈{1,···,β} . The structure of the ND-POR scheme is depicted in Fig. 2 . The ND-POR scheme is now described via each phase of the POR as follows.
Keygen
C generates the secret key: K = {K rtag , K rtag , {K i , K i } i∈{l+1,···,n} , K enc } which are randomly chosen in {0, 1} κ .
Encode
(k ∈ {1, · · · , m}) has the form as Eq. 1 in Sect. 2.3, and where w = z + m. Given a set of m augmented blocks, C computes lβ coded blocks c i j using the linear combinations and stores them on the NC servers {S 1 , · · · , S l }. C then encodes c i j using the dispersal coding into a dispersal coding parity block d i j for each row and stores them on the DC-servers {S l+1 , · · · , S n }. Namely, the encode phase is described as follows.
C computes coded blocks from m augmented blocks:
For ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , l}, ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , β}:
• Compute coded blocks: c i j = m k=1 α i jk b k . Therefore, a matrix {c i j } i∈{1,···,l}, j∈{1,···,β} is constructed.
C computes dispersal coding parity blocks in each row:
For ∀i ∈ {l + 1, · · · , n}, ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , β}, C computes d i j = MTagECC K i ,K i (c i1 , · · · , c il ).
C computes metadata for coded blocks:
For ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , l}:
• Generate w values {ξ 1 , · · · , ξ w }:
where u ∈ {1, · · · , w}.
• For ∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , β}, c i j ∈ F w p is viewed as a column vector of w symbols: c i j = (c i j1 , · · · , c i jw ) with c i ju ∈ F p where u ∈ {1, · · · , w}. C computes Fig. 2 The structure of the ND-POR scheme a repair tag for c i j :
• C encrypts the coefficients:
where k ∈ {1, · · · , m}. This encryption is used to prevent the replay attack.
C distributes data to the servers:
• C sends the coded blocks {c i j } i∈{1,···,l}, j∈{1,···,β} , the encrypted coefficients { i jk } i∈{1,···,l}, j∈{1,···,β},k∈{1,···,m} and the repair tags {T i j } i∈{1,···,l}, j∈{1,···,β} to S i where i ∈ {1, · · · , l}.
• C sends the dispersal coding parity blocks {d i j } i∈{l+1,···,n}, j∈{1,···,β} to S i where i ∈ {l + 1, · · · , n}.
Check
C chooses a number of row indices to challenge the servers using the spot check method. The servers respond C. C checks the responses using the MVerECC algorithm. All the servers operate over the same subset of rows. Because the responses of all the servers lie on a codeword, all the servers can be checked for each challenge. 
The servers respond C: S i computes:
3. C verifies the servers: Because all servers operate over the same subset of rows D, the combined response R = (R 1 , · · · , R n ) is a codeword of the dispersal coding. C firstly checks R by calling MVerECC(R 1 , · · · , R n ) of the dispersal coding to verify. It returns false if the responses are invalid, and return true otherwise. After checking R, C checks the validity of each individual response R i to detect which server is corrupted. For the l NC-servers {S 1 , · · · , S l }, R i is a valid response if it matches the i-th symbol in − → m. For the (n − l) DC-serves
Repair
If a failure is detected in the check phase, C executes the repair phase with the following two sub-phases:
Sub-phase 1. The corruptions are firstly repaired by the RS decoder with the boundary number of corruptions t = n−l+1
2 . If the number of corruptions is more than t, C uses the subphase 2.
Sub-phase 2. The corruptions are repaired by the network coding. C firstly requires the healthy servers to compute the aggregated coded blocks. Then, C combines these coded blocks to generate β coded blocks for the new server. Suppose that S y is the corrupted server and S y is the new server which is used to replace S y .
C requests h healthy servers
the aggregated coded blocks and the proofs of correct encoding:
• C generates the coefficients {x i1 , · · · , x iβ } where • C decrypts the encrypted coefficients from S i to get the raw coefficients:
•
ξ u a iu where {a i1 , · · · , a iw } are the symbols of the block a i . This verification is to ensure that S i does not have the pollution attack.
C repairs S y :
• C generates w values {ξ 1 , · · · , ξ w }:
where u ∈ {1, · · · , w}. 
C sends to the new server S y :
{c y j } j∈{1,···,β} , { y jγ } j∈{1,···,β},γ∈{1,···,h} , {T y j } j∈{1,···,β} .
Security Analysis
This section describes the advantage of the defined adversary and explains how the small corruption attack, large corruption attack, replay attack and pollution attack are prevented.
Adversarial Check and Repair
A MAC consists of three algorithms: {MGen, MTag, MVer}. 
Furthermore, the boundary of the advantage of A on the dispersal coding codeword is given as follows:
Theorem 1: Let Adv codeword (q 1 , q 2 , t) denote the advantage of A on the dispersal coding making q 1 queries to MTagECC, q 2 queries to MVerECC, and running in the time t. If RS-UHF is constructed from an (n, l)-RS code, then the following inequality is obtained:
Proof: Suppose that A is successful when A makes q 1 queries to the tagging oracle MTagECC, q 2 queries to the verification oracle MVerECC and runs in time t. A outputs a codeword (c 1 , · · · , c n ) which can be decoded to the message − → m = (m 1 , · · · , m l ) such that at least one of the last s symbols in the codeword is a valid MAC on − → m computed with UMAC. Another adversary A is considered for the UMAC construction. A is given an access to a tagging oracle UTag κ,κ (·) and a verification oracle UVer κ,κ (·, ·) and needs to output a new message and a tag pair. A chooses a position j ∈ {n − s + 1, · · · , n} randomly, and generates keys 
2 . Furthermore, the number of the original parity blocks before errors is (n − l). Therefore, the number of correct parity blocks is at least From Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, the following inequality is obtained: Adv codeword (q 1 , q 2 , t) ≤ Adv prf (q 1 + q 2 , t) + UHF q 2 . Assume that the PRF is secure and the MAC is unforgeable, then Adv prf (q 1 + q 2 , t) + UHF q 2 (negligible). Therefore, Adv codeword (q 1 , q 2 , t) ≤ ε. In other words, the probability for A to output codeword c such that A can pass the verification is negligible:
Now the probability of A to prevent data recovery is given as the following theorem. In the RDC-NC scheme, there are n servers and α coded blocks per server. Thus, the number of healthy servers in an epoch in the RDC-NC scheme is at least h = m α . In the ND-POR scheme, there are also n servers but such n servers are divided into two types: l NC-servers and (n − l) DC-servers. Because l < n, each NC-server has β = nα l coded blocks. Therefore, the number of healthy servers in each epoch is at least h = m β = ml αn . If the theorem is satisfied, the probability for A to prevent recovering F is negligible:
Small Corruption Attack
Theorem 3: The RS code in the dispersal coding is sufficient to prevent the small corruption attack.
Proof: Let t error denote the number of corruptions caused by A in an epoch. Firstly, because the RS is constructed with the parameter (n, l), the message is interpreted as the description of a polynomial p of the degree less than l which is evaluated at n distinct points {a 1 , · · · , a n }. The sequence of the values is the corresponding codeword C: C = {p(a 1 ), · · · , p(a n )} (Sect. 2.4). Because any two different polynomials of the degree less than l agree in at most (l − 1) points, any two codewords of the RS code disagree in at least n − (l − 1) = n − l + 1 positions. Moreover, there are two polynomials that do agree in (l − 1) points but are not equal. Hence, the distance of the RS code is:
Secondly, because any two strings in C differ in at least d places, we have:
From Eq. 4 and Eq. 5, t error ≤ n−l+1
2 . The inequality reflects the fact that, given any string s, there is at most one string c ∈ C which is within the distance d of t error from s. This means that the advantage of A is always bounded by the error resilience of the RS code.
Large Corruption Attack, Replay Attack and Pollution Attack
The attacks are addressed in the RDC-NC scheme. This section briefly describes the key ideas as follows:
Large corruption attack. In the check phase, using the spot check method, C periodically and randomly samples a set of indices of the coded blocks stored on each server. C then checks whether these sampled blocks match with the embedded MAC. If the adversary corrupts a large fraction of the data stored on the server, C easily detects the corruptions with an optimal computation and I/O at the server and communication between the server and the client. Replay attack. To avoid the adversary A replaying a coded block, the common solution is to use a counter which is incremented each time the coded block on a server is recreated due to server failure. However, in this solution, the client must store locally the latest value of the counters. Therefore, the RDC-NC scheme uses a different solution to mitigate the replay attack and to reduce the storage cost for the client. That is, the coefficients are encrypted and stored together with the coded blocks to prevent A from knowing how the original blocks were combined to obtain the coded block. The ability of A is negligible because A does not know which old coded blocks to replay.
Pollution attack. For each coded block c i j of the server S i , a repair tag which is constructed from a MAC is embedded into the coded block. In the repair phase, C requires a number of servers which are used for data repair to provide their aggregated coded blocks. Before computing the new coded blocks for the new server, C uses the tag to check whether these servers combine the coded blocks correctly. Therefore, the servers cannot inject polluted blocks to C.
Efficiency Analysis
The Table 2 shows that the encode cost in the ND-POR scheme is more than that in the RDC-NC scheme. However, the encode phase is performed only one time in the beginning, but the check and repair phases are performed very often during the system lifetime. Therefore, the check and repair costs are more important than the encode cost. The Table 2 shows that the check and repair costs in the ND-POR scheme are less than these in the RDC-NC scheme. Before analysing the costs in the RDC-NC and ND-POR schemes, recall that each coded block c i j ∈ F w p where w = m + z. The coded block size is w log 2 p. The unit of the below computational complexities is the number of operations over F w p .
Encode Phase
The RDC-NC scheme computes nα coded blocks. Its encode computation cost is thus O(nα). The ND-POR scheme computes lβ coded blocks, then computes (n − l)β dispersal coding parity blocks, where β = 
This means that although the cost in the ND-POR scheme is more than n l times that of the RDC-NC scheme, it is less than double times.
The number of MACs. In the RDC-NC scheme, the number of MACs is nαs where n is the number of servers, α is the number of coded blocks stored on a server, s is the number of segments in a coded block. This is because the MACs are embedded in the segments of the coded blocks. In the ND-POR scheme, the number of MACs is lα where l is a number of servers out of n servers (l < n). This is because the MACs are only required for the network coding coded blocks which are located in only l servers.
Check Phase
The RDC-NC scheme challenges a subset of segment indices in each coded block of a server. C thus needs nα challenges to check all blocks stored on n servers where α is the number of blocks per server. In the ND-POR scheme, C challenges a subset of row indices (the codewords of the dispersal coding). Each codeword lies on all n servers. There are β codewords. C thus needs β = nα l challenges to check all blocks stored on n servers. The cost in the RDC-NC scheme is more than l times that in the ND-POR scheme. This is an advantage of the ND-POR scheme when multiple servers are checked per challenge instead of one sever as the RDC-NC scheme.
Repair Phase
In the RDC-NC scheme, the cost for repairing a corrupted server is O(h ). Because h = m α , the cost is O(|F| 3m α+m ). In the ND-POR scheme, in the subphase 1, the corruptions are repaired by the RS decoder which has O(n log 2 2 n log 2 log 2 n) [29] . Because n is far less than the dominant parameter |F|, the cost of the RS decoder is less than the RDC-NC scheme. Let n = 12 as in the experimental evaluation of the RDC-NC scheme, the RS can decode in only 284 field operations. In the sub-phase 2, the corruptions are repaired by the network coding like the RDC-NC scheme. The cost is thus O(h
). Because h = lm nα , the cost in the ND-POR is thus O(
nα+lm . In both cases, the costs in the ND-POR scheme are still better than the RDC-NC scheme.
• The check computation cost of the RDC-NC scheme is nα = 12 · 3 = 36. Meanwhile, the check computation cost of the ND-POR scheme is • The number of MACs in the RDC-NC scheme is nsα = 12 · 5 · 3 = 180. Meanwhile, the number of MACS in the ND-POR scheme is lα = 10 · 3 = 30.
• The number of the required healthy servers for data repair in the RDC-NC scheme is Suppose that all elements in F p is less than or equal to 1023. This is to let the elements not exceed 10 bits length. These parameters satisfy the conditions which we stated in the manuscript:
• 1 < n l < 2 as stated in Sect. 6.1.
• l = • w < sl n−l as stated in Sect. 6.4. We now show the costs of the RDC-NC and ND-POR schemes.
• The encode computation cost of the RDC-NC scheme is nα = 16 · 5 = 80. Meanwhile, the encode computation cost of the ND-POR scheme is nα • The check computation cost of the RDC-NC scheme is nα = 16 · 5 = 80. Meanwhile, the check computation cost of the ND-POR scheme is = 3000. Meanwhile, the repair computation cost of the ND-POR scheme is n log 2 2 n log 2 log 2 n = 512 (in the case of the RS code), or 3lm|F| nα+lm = 3·14·10·1500 16·5+14·10 = 2863.64 (in the case of the network coding).
• The number of MACs in the RDC-NC scheme is nsα = 16 · 4 · 5 = 320. Meanwhile, the number of MACS in the ND-POR scheme is lα = 14 · 5 = 70.
• The number of the required healthy servers for data repair in the RDC-NC scheme is • The storage cost in the RDC-NC scheme is nα log 2 p(w + s + 1) = 16 · 5 · log 2 1031 · (25 + 4 + 1) = 24000. Meanwhile, the storage cost in the ND-POR scheme is nα log 2 p( nw l + 1) = 16 · 5 · log 2 1031 · ( 16·25 14 + 1) = 23657.
In summary, although the ND-POR scheme combines the network coding and the dispersal coding, the ND-POR scheme is not worse than the RDC-NC scheme in totals.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, the ND-POR scheme is proposed in which the network coding and the dispersal coding technique are combined to reduce the costs of two important phases, the check and the repair phases, and to prevent small corruption attack, replay attack, pollution attack and large corruption.
In future work, we focus on the following problem. The repair phase has not been optimized because the healthy servers need to provide the aggregated coded blocks to the client, then the client computes the new coded blocks and stores them on the new server. A new mechanism can be considered in which the healthy servers send their coded blocks directly to the new server without sending back to the client. This mechanism can reduce the burden for the client and also reduce the communication. To support this mechanism, a signature scheme can be employed such as [30] , [31] that allows the new server to verify the coded blocks provided from the healthy servers instead of the client, and to construct the new coded blocks by itself.
